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THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
SENTENCING REFORM AND APPELLATE REVIEW
WILLI W. WILKINS, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The court year 1987-88 was once again a busy one for the judges of
the Fourth Circuit.' The eleven active circuit judges were assisted in handling
the heavy caseload by two senior circuit judges and many district court
judges who graciously sat with the court by designation. Also, the court
was honored with the presence of Associate Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
(retired) who sat with the court during the October and June terms.
A large portion of the caseload involved criminal appeals that presented
the court with a variety of issues. 2 Although some of the issues involving
challenges to convictions were complex, challenges to the sentences imposed
rarely required extended consideration because of the limited review allowed
of criminal sentences. However, with the recent United States Supreme
Court decision in Mistretta v. United States,3 all levels of the federal court
system face a new dimension in criminal sentencing.
In Mistretta the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Sentencing
Reform Act of 19844 (Reform Act) and the United States Sentencing
Commission (Commission) against several challenges.' The eight to one
majority decision 6 clears the way for further implementation of the Reform
Act and the sentencing guidelines promulgated by the Commission for use
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and Chairman,
United States Sentencing Commission.
This Article should not be interpreted as a statement by the United States Sentencing
Commission.
1. The court disposed of an average of 146 cases per active judge from July 1, 1987
through June 30, 1988.
2. Criminal appeals constituted 13% of the total regular appeals.
3. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
4. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1985)).
5. Defendant Mistretta alleged that the Reform Act violated separation of powers
principles by placing the Commission in the Judicial Branch, requiring that Article III judges
serve on the Commission, and empowering the President to remove Commissioners "for
cause." Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 660, 673 (1989). Mistretta also alleged that
the Reform Act was an excessive delegation of lawmaking authority. Id. at 658, 661, 675. The
Court rejected all these challenges.
6. Justice Blackmun authored the opinion of the Court. Id. at 649. Justice Scalia
dissented in a written opinion. Id. at 675.
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by federal sentencing courts.7 Full, nationwide implementation of the Reform
Act and the sentencing guidelines following an initial period of constitutional
uncertainty8 has a number of significant implications for the federal criminal
justice system, not the least of which is a substantial increase in the criminal
case workload for United States magistrates, United States District Courts,
the twelve United States Courts of Appeals that handle criminal appeals,
and the United States Supreme Court.
The increased volume of criminal appeals arises most directly from the
Reform Act's authorization of appellate review of sentences, 9 which repre-
sents a dramatic change in criminal jurisprudence from the practice that
has prevailed for most of our nation's history. Prior to the advent of the
Reform Act, appeal of sentences in the federal courts was a relatively rare
occurrence, limited to a few special situations and, more generally, to those
instances in which there was an alleged violation of statutory or constitu-
tional law. The Reform Act preserves these general opportunities for ap-
pellate review of sentences and authorizes review of several additional
categories of cases related to application of the sentencing guidelines. The
combined effect is to provide avenues for thousands of additional criminal
defendants each year to bring their cases before the federal appellate courts.
Before examining the new appellate review status in greater detail, it is
useful to consider the past status of appellate review of sentences and some
of the legislative and policy background underlying this dramatic change in
appellate sentencing review.
II. PREvious APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES: GENERAL
NONREVIEWABILITY
Historically, appellate courts have spent little time addressing challenges
to individual criminal sentences. It was well-settled that a federal trial judge
was vested with broad discretion in the sentencing phase of criminal pro-
secutions, and that sentences imposed within the statutory limits generally
were not reviewable on appeal. 10 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit consistently adhered to the doctrine that a sentence within the
7. The initial guidelines were submitted by the Commission to Congress on April 13,
1987, in accordance with section 235(a)(1)(B)(i) of the Reform Act. The guidelines took effect
on November 1, 1987, following the prescribed period of congressional review. They are
applicable to crimes committed after the guidelines became effective. See Pub. L. No. 100-
182, § 2, 101 Stat. 1266 (1987).
8. Prior to the Court's decision in Mistretta, some 160 district courts and the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had invalidated some or all of the Reform Act and the guidelines,
while some 120 district courts and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had upheld the
statute and the guidelines.
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
10. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1972); United States v. Schocket, 753
F.2d 336, 341-42 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Pruitt, 341 F.2d 700 (4th Cir. 1965))
(no abuse of discretion in sentence of 15 years imprisonment for conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute 4,600 tons of marijuana).
SENTENCING REFORM
statutory limits would not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of extraor-
dinary circumstances" and would not be disturbed except for gross abuse
of discretion.' 2
A. Review Under the Eighth Amendment
Even in the face of this general policy of deference, individual sentences
were, and remain, subject to review under the eighth amendment prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishment. 3 In Solem v. Helm the United States
Supreme Court held "as a matter of principle that a criminal sentence must
be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted.'
' 4
The Court established three criteria to guide a reviewing court in a propor-
tionality analysis: "(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdic-
tion; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in
other jurisdictions."' 
5
Although the Court recognized that successful challenges to proportion-
ality of particular sentences would be exceedingly rare outside the context
of capital punishment, it held that proportionality analysis is applicable in
noncapital cases.' 6 In so holding, the Court did not abandon the longstanding
deferential standard of review for sentences:
Absent specific authority, it is not the role of an appellate court to
substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the
appropriateness of a particular sentence; rather, in applying the
Eighth Amendment the appellate court decides only whether the
sentence under review is within constitutional limits. In view of the
substantial deference that must be accorded legislatures and sen-
tencing courts, a reviewing court rarely will be required to engage
in extended analysis to determine that a sentence is not constitu-
tionally disproportionate. '
7
After the decision in Solem, the Fourth Circuit continued to accord
great deference to sentences within statutory limits, holding that an extensive
proportionality analysis is required only in those cases involving life sen-
tences without parole. 8 Even where the court has been concerned about the
11. Schocket, 753 F.2d at 341 (citing United States v. Wilson, 450 F.2d 495 (4th Cir.
1971)).
12. Id. (quoting United States v. Hodge, 394 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1968)).
13. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VIII.
14. 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983).
15. Id. at 292.
16. Id. at 289-90.
17. Id. at 290 n.16.
18. United States v. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 1019, 1028 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1182 (1986).
1989]
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severity of a sentence for less than life, it has refused to conduct a
proportionality review.' 9
B. Review Under the Dangerous Special Offender Statute
Another exception to the general policy of deference was found under
the dangerous special offender statute,20 which provided for enhancement
of felony sentences of defendants adjudged dangerous special offenders.
2'
The standard for appellate review of such enhanced sentences was far
greater than the standard of review generally allowed for sentences.2 This
statute allowed either the defendant or the United States to seek review of
a sentence in a court of appeals, 23 which included consideration of "whether
the procedure employed was lawful, the findings made were clearly erro-
neous, or the sentencing court's discretion was abused. '24
The Fourth Circuit recognized that "[o]ne of the motivating factors
underlying Congress' enactment of this [appellate review] section of the
statute was the desire to limit the discretion of sentencing judges. ' 25 The
Senate Report accompanying the enactment legislation expressed concern
that "haphazard development of excessive, inadequate, and wholly discre-
tionary sentencing has been dismal. Individual defendants have had imposed
upon them palpably excessive or insufficient or inconsistent sentences, doing
injustice sometimes to defendants and sometimes to society." '26 In response
to this problem, appellate courts were empowered to modify or vacate
sentences based on erroneous findings or when found to be unnecessary
and unfair. 27
Some of the concerns which prompted the strictures on sentencing in
the dangerous offender statute also provided impetus for the Reform Act
and promulgation of the sentencing guidelines. With these revolutionary
changes, the discretion of sentencing courts has been reduced and the
sentences imposed subjected to greater scrutiny on appellate review.
III. THE REF Rm ACT: BACKGROUND
The legislative history of section 3742 reflects a careful, deliberative
decision by Congress after lengthy debate and study. Proposals to authorize
19. United States v. Guglielmi, 819 F.2d 451, 456-57 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 731 (1988). The defendant received consecutive maximum five-year sentences on five
related counts of interstate transportation of obscene films. Id. at 453. The court expressed
concern regarding the imposition of a 25-year sentence for five mailings which were instigated
by the FBI, but deferred to the precedent established in Rhodes which precluded a propor-
tionality review. Id. at 456-57.
20. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575, 3576 (1970) (repealed by the Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§ 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1987 (1984), effective November 1, 1986).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3575.
22. United States v. Scarborough, 777 F.2d 175, 179 (4th Cir. 1985).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3576.
24. Id.
25. Scarborough, 777 F.2d at 180.
26. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 85 (1969).
27. Scarborough, 777 F.2d at 180.
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appellate review of sentences preceded legislative consideration of a com-
prehensive sentencing reform package and the concept of sentencing guide-
lines,21 but were later melded into the structure of sentencing reform as a
principal component. The general concept of appellate review of sentences
enjoyed wide bipartisan support in Congress.
The overall purpose of this key provision of the Reform Act was to
establish "a limited practice of appellate review of sentences in the Federal
criminal justice system." '2 9 Although Congress did not desire simply to allow
the substitution of a decision of the appellate court for that of the sentencing
judge, it did want to "control the exercise of that discretion to promote
fairness and rationality, and to reduce unwarranted disparity, in sentenc-
ing." 30 Congress anticipated that appellate review in conjunction with the
sentencing guidelines would accomplish these goals and, furthermore, that
review of guideline application decisions by the appellate courts would
assure correct application and "case law development of the appropriate
reasons for sentencing outside the guidelines. This, in turn, will assist the
Commission in refining the guidelines as the need arises ... [to perhaps
build into the guidelines factors frequently cited as a basis for departure]."'"
Since enactment as part of the Reform Act, the appellate review section
has been the subject of several amendments. The Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure Technical Amendments Act of 198632 deleted certain ill-conceived
provisions that would have authorized an appellate court to change a
sentence determined to have been imposed in violation of law or as a result
of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines. After consideration,
Congress determined that it was more appropriate for an appellate court to
remand a case for further sentencing proceedings in all instances in which
the district court decision was reversed, thereby leaving imposition of the
final sentence to the district court.
33
The Sentencing Act of 198714 made three additional changes to section
3742. Section 4 of that Act added a new procedure for appellate review of
United States magistrates' sentences by district courts in a manner compa-
rable to circuit court review of district court decisions. Section 5 of the Act
provided a "plainly unreasonable" standard for appellate review of sentences
imposed for offenses for which there is no applicable sentencing guideline.
Finally, section 6 of the 1987 Sentencing Act clarified that an appellate
court should affirm a sentence imposed unless a statutory ground for reversal
and remand was present.35
28. Senator Roman Hruska (R. Neb.) was an early and diligent champion of appellate
review of sentences. In 1970, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed S. 1540 (90th Cong.), a
Hruska bill to authorize appellate review, but the bill died in the House.
29. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 149 (1983).
30. Id. at 150.
31. Id. at 151.
32. Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 73, 100 Stat. 3592 (1986).
33. See 132 CONG. Rc. H11294 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986).
34. Pub. L. No. 100-182, §§ 4-6, 101 Stat. 1266 (1987).
35. See 133 CoNG. Rae. H10018 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1987).
1989]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:429
More recently, section 7103 of the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
198836 made further technical and clarifying changes to section 3742 to more
closely conform the statutory language to the structure of the guidelines
and the intent of the appellate review section. This legislation also modestly
reorganized parts of section 3742 to collect in one subsection the provisions
pertaining to appeals of sentences imposed in connection with Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure ll(e)(1)(C) plea agreements.3 7 Finally, the 1988 Act
accomplished a significant clarification of the standard by which appellate
courts are to consider questions involving application of the guidelines to
the facts of a particular case.
The statute previously required that appellate courts "give due regard
to the opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses, and shall accept the findings of fact . . . unless they are clearly
erroneous. s38 The amendment added a significant requirement that appellate
courts also "give due deference to the district court's application of the
guidelines to the facts." '39 The legislative history of the adoption of the
"due deference" standard of review is very instructive:
This standard is intended to give the court of appeals flexibility in
reviewing an application of a guideline standard that involves some
subjectivity. The deference due a district court's determination will
depend upon the relationship of the facts found to the guidelines
standard being applied. If the particular determination involved
closely resembles a finding of fact, the court of appeals would
apply a clearly erroneous test. As the determination approaches a
purely legal determination, however, the court of appeals would
review the determination more closely.40
The level of deference due a sentencing judge's application of the
guidelines to the facts thus depends on the circumstances of the case. If
the issue turns primarily on a factual determination, an appellate court
36. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7103, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
37. Rule 11 provides, in pertinent part:
(e) Plea Agreement Procedure.
(1) In General. The attorney for the government and the attorney for the
defendant or the defendant when acting pro se may engage in discussion
with a view toward reaching an agreement that, upon the entering of a plea
of guilty or noi0 contendere to a charged offense or to a lesser or related
offense, the attorney for the government will do any of the following:
(A) move for dismissal of other charges; or
(B) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's request,
for a particulate sentence, with the understanding that such recommen-
dation or request shall not be binding upon the court; or
(C) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case.
FED. R. CRwm. P. ll(e)(l).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), as it existed prior to these amendments
(concluding sentence).
39. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7103(a)(7), 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
40. 134 CONG. REc. H11257 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988).
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should apply the "clearly erroneous" standard. 41 If a case turns primarily
on the legal interpretation of a guidelines term or on which of several
offense conduct guidelines most appropriately applies to facts as found, the
standard moves to one akin to de novo review. This "due deference"
starldard is, then, the standard courts long have employed when reviewing
mixed questions of fact and law. On mixed questions, courts have not
defined any brightqline standard of review. Rather, the standard of review
applied varies with the "mix" of the mixed question.
IV. APPELLATE REviEw iN GENERAL
Sectiop 3742,42 as amended, authorizes appeal of sentences, by either
the gefendant or the government, if the sentence was imposed in any of
41. See United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. White,
875 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1989).
42. As amended, section 3742 currently reads as follows:
§ 3742. Review of a sentence
(a) Appeal by a defendant.-A defendant may file a notice of appeal in the district
court for review of an otherwise final sentence if the sentence-
(1) was imposed in violation of law;
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guide-
lines; or
(3) is greater than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline range to the
extent that the sentence includes a greater fine or term of imprisonment,
probation, or supervised release than the maximum established in the guideline
range, or includes a more limiting condition of probation or supervised
release under seqtion 3563(b)(6) or (b)(11) than the maximum established in
the guideline range; or
(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing guideline and
is plainly unreasonable.
(b) Appeal by the Governrent.-The Government, with the personal approval of
tl Attorney General or the Solicitor General, may file a notice of appeal in the
district court for review of an otherwise final sentence if the sentence-
(1) was imposed in violation of law;
(2) wqs imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guide-
lines;
(3) is less than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline range to the
extent that the sentence includes a lesser fine or term of imprisonment,
probation, or supervised release than the minimum established in the guideline
range, or includes a less limiting condition of probation or supervised release
under section 3563(b)(6) or (b)(11) than the minimum established in the
guideline range; or
(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing guideline and
is plainly unreasonable.
(c) plea agreements.-In the case of a plea agreement that includes a specific sentence
under rule 11(e)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure-
(1) a defendant may not file a notice of appeal under paragraph (3) or (4) of
subsection (a) unless the sentence imposed is greater than the sentence set
forth in such agreement; and
(2) the Government may not file a notice of appeal under paragraph (3) or (4)
of subsection (b) unless the sentence imposed is less than the sentence set
19891
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four situations: (1) in violation of law; (2) as a result of incorrect application
of the sentencing guidelines; (3) as a departure from the applicable guideline
range or from a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement; or (4) for an offense not
forth in such agreement.
(d) Record on review.-If a notice of appeal is filed in the district court pursuant
to subsection (a) or (b), the clerk shall certify to the court of appeals-
(1) that portion of the record in the case that is designated as pertinent by either
of the parties;
(2) the presentence report; and
(3) the information submitted during the sentencing proceeding.
(e) Consideration.-Upon review of the record, the court of appeals shall determine
whether the sentence-
(1) was imposed in violation of law;
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guide-
lines;
(3) is outside the applicable guideline range, and is unreasonable, having regard
for-
(A) the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, as set forth in
chapter 227 of this title; and
(B) the reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence, as stated by
the district court pursuant to the provisions of section 3553(c); or
(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing
guideline and is plainly unreasonable.
The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the district court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept the findings of fact of the
district court unless they are clearly erroneous and shall give due deference to the
district court's application of the guidelines to the facts.
(f) Decision and disposition.-If the court of appeals determines that the sentence-
(1) was imposed in violation of law or imposed as a result of an incorrect
application of the sentencing guidelines, the court shall remand the case for
further sentencing proceedings with such instructions as the court considers
appropriate;
(2) is outside the applicable guideline range and is unreasonable or was imposed
for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing guideline and is
plainly unreasonable, it shall state specific reasons for its conclusions and-
(A) if it determines that the sentence is too high and the appeal has been
filed under subsection (a), it shall set aside the sentence and remand the
case for further sentencing proceedings with such instructions as the
court considers appropriate;
(B) if it determines that the sentence is too low and the appeal has been
filed under subsection (b), it shall set aside the sentence and remand the
case for further sentencing proceedings with such instructions as the court
considers appropriate;
(3) is not described in paragraph (1) or (2), it shall affirm the sentence.
(g) Application to a sentence by a magistrate.-An appeal of an otherwise final
sentence imposed by a United States magistrate may be taken to a judge of the
district court, and this section shall apply as though the appeal were to a court
of appeals from a sentence imposed by a district court.
(h) Guideline not expressed as a range.-For the purpose of this section, the term
"guideline range" includes a guideline range having the same upper and lower
limits.
18 U.S.C. § 3742 (Supp. 1989).
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covered by the sentencing guidelines (if plainly unreasonable or if a departure
from a Rule 1 l(e)(1)(C) plea agreement).
Significantly, the statute does not authorize appeal of a sentence imposed
within the guidelines as a result of a correct application of the guidelines.
4
If the sentencing court correctly applies the guidelines and sentences within
the applicable guideline range, neither the government nor the defendant
has a right to appeal based on an assertion that the court should have
departed from the guideline range. The absence of statutory appeal author-
ization in this instance appears to have been a conscious decision by
Congress, 44 and although there have been recommendations to create such
a right,4 no legislation to accomplish that objective has been seriously
considered. The effect of insulating a correctly applied, "within-guideline"
sentence from appellate review is to leave a defendant or the government
in no worse position than before enactment of the Reform Act. 46 Addition-
ally, shielding within-guideline decisions from appellate review provides an
additional measure of respect for the guidelines scheme of determining an
appropriate range of sentence for defendants with similar offense conduct
and prior criminal history.47
V. APPELLATE REVIEW OF GUIDELINE DEPARTURES
Foregoing a discussion of appellate review of sentences in the other
situations authorized by section 3742,48 this article will examine appellate
review of guideline departures. The statutory scheme for review of sentences
that depart from the otherwise applicable guideline range involves the
43. Nor does the statute permit an appeal of a sentence that is consistent with a Rule
1 l(e)(l)(C) plea agreement.
44. The Senate Report explains that the guidelines "provide a practical basis for distin-
guishing the cases where review is most needed from where appeal would most likely be
frivolous." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 154 (1983).
45. See, e.g., Sentencing Guidelines: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 485 (1987) (testimony
of Judge Jon 0. Newman, U.S. Court of Appeals, 2d Cir.); Sentencing Commission Guidelines:
Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 197-199 (1987)
(discussion among Senator Specter and Judges Becker, Mazzone, and Tjoflat).
46. As indicated, supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text, in general there was no
preexisting right to appellate review of a sentence imposed within the statutory maximum and
minimum for the offense,
47. The Reform Act provides a six-month period of congressional review of guidelines
and amendments to guidelines issued by the Commission. This substantial period of congres-
sional review and opportunity to legislatively modify Commission decisions, as well as the
ability of Congress, at any time, to directly amend the guidelines or direct the Commission to
amend them, serves as a check upon arbitrary or unreasonable Commission action. Because
of legislative monitoring, as well as requirements that the Commission follow certain Admin-
istrative Procedure Act ("APA") processes to assure public input into the Commission's
guideline promulgation decisions, Congress did not find it necessary that the guidelines be
subject to general appellate review under the APA in the manner which applies to most other
agency rules. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 181 (1983).
48. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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interplay of section 3742 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), the provision of the
Reform Act that sets out the bases for departure decisions.4 9 In turn, the
statutory scheme meshes with the sentencing guidelines jointly to determine
when a departure is appropriate, as well as how much of a departure is
reasonable.
A. Statutory Bases for Departures
A close reading of the language demonstrates that the departure standard
set forth in section 3553(b) envisions a two-prong test. First, the court must
identify one or more aggravating or mitigating circumstances (or factors)
of a kind or degree 0 "not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines." Second, having
identified one or more factors not adequately accounted for in the guidelines,
the court may depart from the guideline range only if it further determines
that the factor(s) "should result in a sentence different from that described"
by the applicable guidelines.
The first part of the test entails an examination of the circumstances
of each individual case in relation to the factors that the Commission
appears to have considered in formulating the guidelines and to have
incorporated into the structure of the guidelines, either as part of the base
offense level, as a specific offense characteristic, or as some other adjustment
to the offense level. In determining whether a factor was adequately taken
into consideration by the Commission, section 3553(b) states that the court
shall confine its examination to the guidelines, and the policy statements
and official commentary of the Commission." Thus, the sentencing court
may not concern itself with background documents considered by the
Commission, the extent or adequacy of Commission debate about a partic-
49. The relevant portion of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) provides as follows:
Application of guidelines in imposing a sentence.-The court shall impose a sentence
of the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court
finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that
described. In determining whether a circumstance was adequately taken into consid-
eration, the court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements,
and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission....
50. The "kind or degree" language was added by section 3 of the Sentencing Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 3, 101 Stat. 1266. The legislative history of that amendment,
read in conjunction with that of the Reform Act, makes clear that Congress intended the
inserted language to clarify or make explicit that which was originally intended in the Reform
Act. Compare 133 CONG. REc. H10016-21 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1987) (statements of Rep.
Conyers and Rep. Fish) and 133 CONG. REc. S16647 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (statement of
Senator Hatch) with S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 78-79 (1983).
51. This provision also was added to the Reform Act by section 3 of the Sentencing Act
of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 3, 101 Stat. 1266. The legislative intent is succinctly expressed
at 133 CONG. REc. S16647-48 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (statements of Senators Thurmond
and Kennedy).
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ular factor, or subjective Commissioner intent regarding a factor. Rather,
the court must make its determination solely by looking to the language of
the Guidelines Manual and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom. As
will be explained in greater detail below, the Commission has provided
guidance to the courts in determining what the Commission believes it has
adequately considered in formulating the guidelines. This guidance consists
of the language of particular guidelines, as well as accompanying commen-
tary and a general description of the Commission's approach to the scope
of guidelines and departures.
Although sometimes overlooked, there is a distinct second prong to the
departure standard in section 3553(b). A departure must be based not only
upon a factor not taken into account in the guidelines, but also upon a
determination that the factor is of sufficient importance in the case that it
"should result" in a sentence outside the applicable guideline range. The
existence of a guideline range, which under the current guidelines generally
varies by the greater of six months or 25% between the low and high points,
provides flexibility that may be adequate for the court to give appropriate
weight to a factor not accounted for in the guideline. For example, in a
typical case in which the court might otherwise appropriately sentence near
the middle of the range, the presence of an unaccounted-for, mitigating, or
aggravating circumstance may be a basis for sentencing at another point in
the range. The court may determine that such a decision gives adequate
weight to the factor in the case and that a guideline departure should not
result.52
The "should result" aspect of the departure test basically calls for
weighing a possible departure factor's importance or substantiality on a
case-specific basis, in conjunction with other factors in the case. It also
involves an evaluation of the reasonableness of using that factor as a basis
for departure, in terms of appellate courts' evaluation of departure decisions.
B. Commission Approach to Departures
Having described the statutory bases for a departure from the applicable
guideline range, consideration also must be given to the manner in which
the Commission approached its guideline promulgation task in relation to
the statutory departure standard. Commission pronouncements on depar-
tures are interspersed throughout the Guidelines Manual. The general Com-
52. The Senate Report confirms the importance of this second part of the departure test
and further illustrates the congressional view of its practical effect:
The provision recognizes, however, that even though the judge finds an aggravating
or mitigating circumstance in the case that was not adequately considered in the
formulation of guidelines, the judge might conclude that the circumstance does not
justify a sentence outside the guidelines. Instead, he might conclude that a sentence
at the upper end of the range in the guidelines for an aggravating circumstance, or
at the lower end of the range for a mitigating circumstance, was more appropriate
or that the circumstance should not affect the sentence at all.
S. REp. No. 225, supra note 50, at 79.
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mission approach, often referred to as the "heartland" approach, is described
in Chapter One. 3 As this introductory comment indicates, the Commission
intends that each guideline and each specific offense characteristic apply to
a certain range of similar conduct called the "heartland" of the guideline.
The parameters of this range of typical conduct are to be determined by
the sentencing court, again based on the written Commission pronounce-
ments within the "four corners" of the Guidelines Manual and reasonable
inference drawn therefrom. In policy statement section 5K2.0, the Commis-
sioi further expands upon its view of departures and the circumstances
under which they may or may not be appropriate.
In addition to a detailed description of this general approach to building
specific factors into the guidelines, the Commission also has described several
different kinds of departure circumstances.14 One important kind of depar-
ture circumstance is what has come to be known as "Commission-identified"
or "invited departures." These refer to language in the commentary accom-
panying specific guidelines in which the Commission expressly has identified
circumstances that it did not "adequately consider" in constructing a
guideline and that may warrant a departure if they occur. For example, in
Guideline section 2D1.1, the offense guideline applicable to drug trafficking,
the Commission has scaled the guideline offense level according to the
quantity of drugs involved in the "revelant conduct" 5 of the offense.
However, in Application Note 9 of the accompanying commentary, the
Commission notes that scaling offense levels according to drug quantity
sometimes may not adequately account for unusually high drug purity (a
factor that often indicates a prominent role in the criminal enterprise).
Thus, the presence of unusually pure narcotics "may warrant" an upward
departure, particularly when this factor is associated with smaller drug
quantities.
Occasionally, the commentary accompanying a particular guideline not
only describes an "invited departure" but also suggests how the court
should structure or limit its departure decision. For example, the Application
Note in the commentary to section 2G1.1 which pertains to interstate
transportation for the purposes of prostitution, describes circumstances not
adequately considered in that guideline and specifically suggest limits on the
amount of departure.
Another kind of departure the Commission discusses in the Guidelines
Manual Introduction involves aggravating or mitigating circumstances not
53. UNITED STATES SENTENCING CoMMIssIoN, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL,
1-6 (rev. ed. 1988) (hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL].
54. The first kind of departure discussed in the Introduction, interpolation, will not be
mentioned here, inasmuch as the Commission has determined interpolation is unnecessary and
proposed an amendment to delete the discussion pertaining to it. See 54 Fed. Reg. 9122, 9123,
9126 (1989) (Proposed Amendments 3 and 19).
55. See GUIDELINEs MANUAL, supra note 53, at 17 (defining "relevant conduct"); see
also id. at 70 (discussing amount and type of drugs involved in offense as factors in determining
offense level).
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adequately considered in the guidelines and also not specifically identified
by the Commission as a departure opportunity in the commentary accom-
panying particular guidelines. These factors may be of the general variety
listed in Chapter Five, Part K of the Guidelines, or they may be some other
factor presented in the case which the court identifies and which may
properly be labeled judicially-created departures. Although theoretically
there is no limit to the number of factors that potentially could form the
basis for a departure from the applicable guideline range, in reality, as
section 3553(b) envisions, many factors are not of sufficient importance to
warrant a sentence outside the guideline range. Thus, the Commission
expects that departures based upon factors that it has not identified will be
associated with highly unusual cases.56 In fact, the latest statistics from the
Monitoring and Evaluation Division of the Commission show that 82.3%
of sentences imposed under the guidelines since November 1, 1987 were
within the appropriate guideline ranges, 5.7% were outside the appropriate
ranges because of substantial assistance (a statutorily recognized basis for
departure), 2.9% were upward departures, and only 9.1%, including ne-
gotiated pleas, commission-invited departures, and judicially-created depar-
tures, resulted in downward departures.
C. Interface of Appellate Review with Departure Standard and
Commission Standard
The language and purposes of the portion of the Reform Act authorizing
appellate review of sentences have been considered briefly. In addition, the
two-prong test embodied in the Reform Act authorizing a sentencing court
to depart from the otherwise applicable sentencing guideline range has been
examined. Finally, the general approach to guideline drafting and departures
described by the Commission, as well as different kinds of departures that
the Commission envisioned, have been reviewed. The question remains: how
does all of this fit together into a framework for appellate court consider-
ation of departure decisions?
First, the language of subsections 3742(e)(3) and (f)(2), which pertain
to consideration and disposition of a departure sentence appeal, requires an
appellate court determination of whether the departure is "unreasonable,"
taking into account all of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to be considered
in imposing a sentence,' 7 and the sentencing court's reasons supporting the
56. See id. at 8 (discussing Commission's views on departures from sentencing guidelines).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1985 & Supp. 1989) provides as follows:
§ 3553. Imposition of a sentence
(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.-The court shall impose a
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes
set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the
particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider-
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
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departure decision. From the appellate court's view of a departure, the
"reasonableness" of that departure decision ordinarily must encompass both
the reasonableness of the determination of whether departure is warranted
in the first place, as well as the reasonableness of the armount or extent of
departure.
5 1
As an abstract prdpbsition, the scope of appellate revieW of departures
under a "reasonableness" standard, which some commentators have aSso-
ciated with the substantial evidence test, might be said to be more deferential
to the sentencing court than the clearly erroneous standard. 9 However,
where the issue on appeal concerns the correctness of the factual findings
underlying the decision to depart, surely the appropriate standard will be a
review for clear error. Regarding other departure issues, the deference to
be extended the sentencing court will vary according to whether tlie issu6
presented concerns the reasonableness of the departure or the reasohablehess
of the extent of the departure. 60
Congress has supplied a specific statutory test for sentencing tburt
departure decisions in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), 61 and appellate courts should
of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for thd law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal Coriduct;
(C) to protect th public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in tlte most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for the applicable
category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as let
forth in the guidelines that are issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(1) and that are in effect on the date the defendant is
sentenced;
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(2) that is in effect on the date the defehdant is sentenced;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence dispatities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar condut; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
58. Alternatively, it is possible to interpret the phrase "ii outside thg applicable guideline
range, and is unreasonable" in section 3742(e) and f) in such a way that the "dnreasonable"
standard applies orily to the extent of the delarture above or below the guideline range and
not to the decision to depart in the first place. Under that interpretation, an appellate court
would have to read into section 3742 the two-part departure standard of section 3 53(b) in
order to have means for the consideration and disposition of the initial sentencirig cdtlrt
determination to impose a sentence outside the guideline range. The more straightforward view
seems to be that expressed in this article, Le., readirtg the "unreasonable" standard as covering
all parts of the departure decision, but Uising the langdage of section 3553(b) to more fully
define what is reasonable.
59. See, e.g., K. DAvis, ArnmnsmTmAnv LAW: CAAE-TEXT-PROBLEMS 75-78 (1977).
60. Note that section 3742(0(2) requires that an appellate court "shall state specific
reasons for its conclusions" as to why a district court departure decision is unreasonable. 18
U.S.C. § 3742(0(2) (Supp. 1989),
61. See supra note 49.
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use the same statutory test as a means of assessing whether a decision to
sentence outside the applicable guideline range is unreasonable. Applying
the departure standard in section 3553(b) and the Commission's approach
to departures, it is apparent that the appellate evaluation of reasonableness
in relation to an "invited departure" decision is simplified. If the Commis-
sion expressly has identified an aggravating or mitigating circumstance that
it has not adequately taken into account in the guidelines and, consequently,
has stated that a departure "may be warranted," then obviously the
appellate court need not be as concerned with the reasonableness of the
departure decision itself.
However, even in the case of the typical Commission-invited departure,
only the first half of the section 3553(b) departure test is per se established.
62
The sentencing court ordinarily still must weigh the importance of the factor
in the given case to determine if the factor "should result" in a sentence
outside the guideline range, and the appellate court in turn must assess the
reasonableness of that decision, paying particular attention to the sentencing
court's statement of reasons as to why a sentence outside the guideline
range was justified. Finally, if the appellate court finds that some departure
was reasonable, it also must consider the reasonableness of the extent of
departure above or below the otherwise applicable guideline range. Here
again, the sentencing court's statement of reasons, as well as the section
3553(a) factors, must be considered carefully.
On the other hand, when the departure decision is founded upon a
circumstance that the sentencing court, without the aid of a specifically-
invited departure, determines was not adequately considered in the guide-
lines, it may not be appropriate for the appellate court to simply substitute
its judgment de novo for that of the sentencing court, but a more thorough
review generally will be required. In such a situation, the evaluation of the
reasonableness of the departure necessarily must focus on both prongs of
the section 3553(b) departure standard to determine if each was satisfied,
as well as on the extent of departure. The appellate court must independently
evaluate the pertinent language in the Guidelines Manual, including the
introductory commentary describing the Commission's approach, to deter-
mine if the sentencing court reasonably concluded that the circumstance
cited as a basis for departure was not adequately taken into consideration
by the Commission in formulating the guidelines.
62. Some Commission-identified departures are expressed more strongly than the typical
"may be warranted" language of an invited departure. For example, Application Note 1 of
the commentary under Prostitution Guideline § 2G.lI states that if "the defendant did not
commit the offense for profit and the offense did not involve physical force or coercion, the
Commission recommends a downward departure of 8 levels." GUIDELWIs MANUAL, supra note
53, at 97 (emphasis added). Similarly, commentary under the Official Victim adjustment in §
3A1.2 states that if the victim was one of several officials not expressly covered in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1114, the court shall depart upward by at least three levels. Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
The stronger the language of invitation, of course, the more likely it is that a decision to
depart from the guideline range is per se reasonable.
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The fact that the district court relied upon a factor in the case that is
among those listed in Chapter Five, Part K of the Guidelines Manual, may
or may not be a sufficient indicator of whether the particular factor
adequately was taken into account by the offense conduct guidelines appli-
cable to the particular case. This is because some of the departure factors
listed in section 5K2 obviously have been incorporated, at least to some
degree, into particular offense guidelines in Chapter Two. 63
The appellate court's scrutiny of a departure not specifically invited by
the Commission also must extend to the second prong of the section 3553(b)
departure standard. Finally, just as with invited departures, the appellate
court must also apply the reasonableness standard to the extent of departure
above or below the guideline range, again taking into consideration the
purposes of sentencing, other factors in section 3553(a), and the justification
in the district court's statement of reasons.
When the issue is the reasonableness of the extent of departure, the
appellate courts should give greater deference to the district court's decision.
However, the deference is not unfettered. Congress again has incorporated
by reference statutory criteria to assist in determining the reasonableness of
the sentence. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) references the factors to
be considered in imposing sentences (set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)) and
the district court's specific departure reasons. Among the sentencing factors
listed in section 3553(a)(1) that the appellate court should reference to assess
whether the extent of departure in a particular case was reasonable are the
sentencing guidelines themselves. In a case in which the applicable guideline
range may not account for one or more factors in a specific case (therefore
making some amount of departure reasonable), analogy to other guideline
provisions may provide a basis for assessing whether the extent of departure
also was reasonable.64
In summary, while the reasonableness standard will be interpreted and
defined by subsequent case law, the incorporation into this standard of the
section 3553(b) departure test and the section 3553(a) sentencing factors
provides specific content that will permit a broader judicial inquiry than
otherwise would be warranted by a bare reasonableness standard alone.
65
63. See, e.g., United States v. Uca, 867 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1989) (fact that firearms
offense may have significantly endangered national security, public health, or safety, although
potential departure factor listed in § 5K2.14, does not justify departure in case because offense
conduct guideline adequately considers that factor).
64. For example, it might be appropriate and reasonable for a sentencing court to depart
upward because a pending state felony offense for which the defendant had been convicted
but not yet sentenced is not counted in the defendant's criminal history score for the instant
offense. However, absent other aggravating circumstances, it probably would be unreasonable
to depart upward to a greater sentence than would have been justified had the criminal history
score included that prior state felony offense.
65. Like the due deference standard for reviewing guideline application issues, the
reasonableness standard for reviewing departures should not be viewed as a fixed point within
the scope of review spectrum, but rather as something of a sliding scale, depending on the
particular aspect of a departure decision being reviewed. For example, if the question is
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V. CONCLUSION
The Reform Act and guideline sentencing represent a dramatic change
in our criminal justice system, and federal courts at all levels are working
hard to adjust. The final result will be achievement of the goals of the
Reform Act and a resulting system of justice which is fairer, more honest,
and more effective than the system of the past.
whether the evidence establishes the existence of a mitigating circumstance that could conceiv-
ably be a basis for departure, the standard might equate with clearly erroneous. On the other
hand, the standard for reviewing the question of whether a mitigating factor, once found, has
been adequately considered in formulating the guidelines ordinarily would be broader and less
deferential to the district court.
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